

CONTROL NO. \_\_\_\_\_

CROSS REF: ODP- 83-573 C-106 (C-106)  
~~IF 83-0219 (C-106)~~

PRIOR PAPERS ON THIS SUBJECT: NO YES

PRIOR CORRES SENT TO: \_\_\_\_\_

OTHER COMMENTS: *Bring forward*  
*C-106*

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE NO: *B-216*

CROSS REF: *C-106*

<b>TRANSMITTAL SLIP</b>		<b>DATE</b>
<b>TO:</b> <i>ER</i>		
<b>ROOM NO.</b> <i>7E12</i>	<b>BUILDING</b>	
<b>REMARKS:</b>  <i>fyi</i>		
<b>FROM:</b> <i>OD/OCR</i> <i>2-F-60 - 150</i>		
<b>ROOM NO.</b>	<b>BUILDING</b>	<b>EXTENSION</b>

FORM NO. 241  
1 FEB 58

REPLACES FORM 36-8  
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

Executive Registry

848

15 February 1984

14. ICS 83-4007

ER 83-0219+1+2

ER 82-13285+1-4

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Intelligence Information Handling Committee

FROM:

:

CIA Member, Intelligence Information Handling Committee

SUBJECT

:

CIA Review of the Preliminary CIRS Security Plan

1. The IIHC draft CIRS Security Plan has been reviewed by senior security, data processing, and information officials in this Agency. There is general agreement that while the Plan represents an excellent *set of standards*, it is premature to issue any such Plan until the Community has agreed upon a Community information sharing *policy*. The draft Plan outlines minimum safeguards within eight areas of security without benefit of a well-defined Community data sharing agreement. Any CIA comments on the proposals or modifications to the Plan will be postponed until a Community information sharing policy is developed and promulgated. Once that is accomplished, many of the security guidelines in the Plan can be utilized as the base. Until a data sharing policy is promulgated, a security plan should not be published for CIRS.

2. The CIA Information Systems Board has established a Computer Security Working Group that is charged with developing an Agency-wide information sharing policy for the Board's consideration sometime in the next six months. Once the Agency Board has examined the proposed policy and it has been approved by senior Agency management, I will present it to the IIHC.

3. There are also several Community studies underway including the DDCI's COMPUSEC Safeguards Working Group and the RECON Guard Project. It would be advantageous for the IIHC to await the results of these studies before issuing any preliminary CIRS Security Plan.

4. The eight areas of security addressed in the Plan -- computer hardware, computer software, communications security, physical security, emanation, documentation, personnel, and procedures -- all avoid the central issue -- need-to-know -- that must govern CIRS or any information sharing system. In addition, the draft Plan notes that "many aspects of network security, inter-network connections in particular, have not been resolved" and proposes that a "full set of CIRS requirements for network and inter-network security will be developed as these issues can be resolved." It is not logical for this Agency to concur or to comment on a Preliminary Plan until these basic issues are covered. I agree with you that the minimum security features are well defined in the Plan and that they may be "achievable" but do they achieve the goal of providing only *authorized* US intelligence analysts with relevant multi-source information?

SECRET 

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SUBJECT: CIA Review of the Preliminary CIRS Security Plan

5. Section 3.7 of the Plan provides for bilateral agreements between agencies to allow the originator of the information to specify who and how the shared information will be accessed. It is my opinion, however, that it will be difficult or impossible to develop a meaningful bilateral agreement without a Community-wide information sharing policy. [ ]

6. In your opening remarks to the IIHC as its new Chairman, you indicated that the IIHC would assume responsibility for the Community Security Working Group. I endorse this because we cannot achieve an effective CIRS without a firm policy that delineates how the Community will share its computer data bases via networks. [ ]

7. I am told by the Director of Data Processing that current SAFE planning in the Agency does not contain any requirements for connecting SAFE to CIRS. It is further my understanding that the initial Agency commitment to CIRS was made on the assumption that there would be annual reviews of the CIRS project. I recommend that we assess the success of CIRS after Phase I [ ] before we promulgate an extensive set of security standards. [ ] will operate under existing COINS security standards and an MOU (under discussion) between State and NSA, and failure to approve a Preliminary Security Plan should not impact on the implementation of this first CIRS node. We should not proceed into Stages II and III without a Community data sharing policy that is endorsed by all participants in CIRS. [ ]

Distribution:

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